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Operation Prone
Operation Prone
Operation Prone was a proposed military operation by the South African Defence Force (SADF) and South West
African Territorial Force (SWATF) during the South African Border War and Angolan Civil War between May and
September 1988. With the advance of the 50th Cuban Division towards Calueque and the South-West Africa border,
the SADF formed the 10 SA Division to counter this threat. The plan for Operation Prone had two phases. Operation
Linger was to be a counterinsurgency phase and Operation Pact a conventional phase.
32.1 Background
Like all good battle plans, events on the ground caused well thought out plans to rapidly change and evolve and
this was the case with the proposed SADF plan that came to be called Operation Prone. Caught of guard by the
rapid movement southwards by the Cuban 10th Division, who appearance was first noticed during April/May 1988
when SADF units in south-western Angola started to come into contact with advancing Cuban/FAPLA units, serious
planning begun.[1]:702 Initially the plans were developed as a proposed attack on the Cuban/FAPLA forces in south-
western Angola but as events on the ground changed and peace talks developed, the plans evolved to one of a defence
of north-western South-West Africa.
32.1.1 South African threat assessment
The South Africans anticipated attacks from two or three fronts possibly from Cahama, Xangongo or Ondjiva towards
Ruacana and Calueque.[1]:723 They believed that the Cubans response to any South African counterattack, could be
attacks by Cuban forces on SADF bases at Rundu, Ruacana, Oshakati, Ondangwa and Grootfontein and could also
involve SWAPO insurgents in the SADF rear during the attacks.[1]:724 The SADF’s main conventional unit in SWA,
61 Mechanised Battalion was in a state of reorganisation and training after Operation Hooper.[1]:723 32 Battalion and
101 Battalion were engaged in south-western Angola against SWAPO while the other main conventional unit, 4 SAI,
was also reorganising in South Africa and would be combat ready in SWA by 25 July.[1]:725 The South African did
not believe that Cuban/FAPLA forces in south-eastern Angola at Cuito Cuanavale would try and attack the UNITA’s
bases at Mavinga and Jamba. This meant Cuban/FAPLA forces would concentrate their efforts in south-western
Angola.[1]:727
32.2 Order of Battle
32.2.1 South African and South West Africa Territorial forces
10 SA Division (Operation Hilti/Prone) – Brigadier Chris Serfontein[1]:899
HQ 10 SA Division – Oshakati
61 Mechanised Battalion incl. One tank squadron
4 SAI Battalion – no tank squadron
32 Battalion
101 Battalion
81 Armour Brigade
• Brigade HQ
• one tank regiment – 3 squadrons Pretoria Regiment
• one mechanized battalion – 1 Regiment Northern Transvaal
• one armoured car regiment – 2 Light Horse Regiment
• one field engineer regiment – 15 Field Regiment
• one anti-aircraft battery – Regiment Eastern Transvaal
• one engineer support squadron
• one signal unit – 81 Signal Regiment
• one maintenance unit – 20 Maintenance Unit
• one field workshop – 32 Field Regiment
• one medical battalion group – 6 Medical Battalion Group
• one provost platoon – 8 Provost Unit
71 Motorised Brigade
• HQ Cape Town Highlanders
• two mechanized infantry companies – Cape Town Highlanders Regiment
• one support weapons company – Cape Town Highlanders
• one armoured car regiment – Regiment Orange River
• one field engineer troop – 6 Field Engineer Regiment
• one signal troop – 7 Signal Group
• one maintenance platoon – 4 Maintenance Unit
• one medical battalion – 3 Medical Battalion
• one light workshop troop – 71 Field Regiment
• one provost platoon – 7 Provost Unit
Parachute Battalion Group
• three parachute companies
• one parachute support company
• one anti aircraft troop
• one engineer troop
• one signal troop
• one maintenance platoon
• one reconnaissance section
• one light workshop troop
• one provost platoon
• one medical team
• two mobile air operations teams
10 Artillery Brigade
• HQ 10 Artillery Brigade
• one G-5 battery – 4 SAI
• one G-5 battery – 61 Mechanised Battalion
• one G-2 battery – 17 Field Regiment
• one G-2 battery – Transvaal State Artillery
• one G-2 battery – 51 Battalion
• one MRL battery – 32 Battalion
• one MRL battery – 4 Artillery Regiment
• one 120 mm mortar battery – 4 Artillery Regiment
• one 120 mm mortar battery – 18 Light Artillery Regiment Parachute Brigade
• two meteorological sections
Reserves
• HQ elements from 71 Motorised Brigade
• HQ elements from 8 Armour Division
• HQ elements from 44 Parachute Brigade
• one G-5 battery – based in SE Angola
• one G-2 battery – 71 Motorised Brigade
• 8 Maintenance Unit
• 30 Corps Maintenance Unit
• two 32mm anti aircraft batteries
• one provost platoon
10 SA Division (Operation Prone) – Brigadier Chris Serfontein[1]:904
Task Force X-ray – Colonel Leon Marais
• 53 Battalion
• 54 Battalion
• 4 SAI Battalion
• one combat wing – 101 Battalion
• 17 Field Regiment HQ
• one G5 battery – 4 SAI
32.2. ORDER OF BATTLE
• one G2 battery – 17 Field Regiment
• one MRL battery – 17 Field Regiment
• one AA battery – Regiment Vaal River
Task Force Zulu – Colonel Mucho Delport
• 51 Battalion
• 52 Battalion
• 102 Battalion
• 32 Battalion
• 61 Mechanised Battalion incl. One tank squadron
• one combat wing – 101 Battalion
• 14 Artillery Regiment HQ
• one G2 battery – Transvaal State Artillery Regiment
• one 35mm AA troop – Regiment Orange Free State
• two 20mm AA troops – Regiment Eastern Transvaal
Task Force Yankee – Colonel Jan Lusse
• HQ 81 Armour Brigade
• HQ 10 Artillery Brigade
• one tank regiment (less one tank squadron) – 81 Armour Brigade
• one mechanized infantry company – 81 Armour Brigade
• one armoured car squadron – Light Horse Regiment|2 Light Horse Regiment
• two armoured car squadrons – 1 & 2 Special Service Battalion
• one 120mm mortar battery – 4 Artillery Regiment
Task Force Whiskey
• all counter-insurgency units from Tsumeb/Grootfontein/Otavi
10 Artillery Regiment – Colonel Jean Lausberg
32.2.2 Cuban forces
50th Division[1]:722 – Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia Font
• three special forces battalions – Cuban SPETSNAZ
• three tank battalions – Cuban tank regiment (105-110 tanks)
• one artillery regiment – Cuban regiment
• six infantry regiments – Cuban and Angolan soldiers (1500-2000 men each plus tanks)
• three raiding battalions – Cuban and SWAPO soldiers (200 Cuban + 250 SWAPO each)
• Missile air defence batteries, air force helicopters and aircraft
32.3 Clashes begin
With the Cuban movements southwards and continuing SADF/South West African Territorial Force operations
against SWAPO in same area, both forces would soon come into contact with each other. On 18 April, a SWATF
unit, 101 Battalion, chasing a SWAPO unit was ambushed by Cuban elements from Xangongo near Chipeque.[2]:249
The battle ended with the South Africans losing two men and eleven wounded.[3]:237 Thereafter the Cubans continued
patrolling southwards from Xangongo towards the SADF garrison at Calueque.
On 2 May, SAAF Mirages attacked FAPLA positions south of Techipa.[3]:238 The Cubans, fearing a South African
advance, retaliated and planned another ambush. During the first round tripartite talks in London on the 3 May,
behind the scene talks between the military contingents of Cuba and South Africa was tense. The Cubans threatened
to invade SWA/Namibia if the South Africans did not agree to the Cuban proposals while the South African indicated
if they tried, it would be Cuba’s darkest day.[3]:239 The talks ended the following day. The Cuban ambush site was
in position by 4 May less than 2 km south of Donguena.[3]:238 A SADF unit, the 101 Battalion, with twenty Casspirs
and two trucks had been sent forward to occupy Donguena. They ran into the ambush with Cubans destroying or
damaging four Casspirs. The South Africans withdrew at dusk having lost seven men and one captured,[3]:238 Sergeant
Johan Papenfus[4]:164 and failed to retrieve the fourth Casspir and its equipment. The Cubans were said to have lost
forty five soldiers.[3]:238 Later that evening, a further three companies from 201 and 101 Battalions were sent forward
to capture Donguena, but with Cuban tank positions south of the town, withdrew.[3]:238 The Cuban later withdrew
the same evening.
On 12 May, the 32 Battalion commander was called to a meeting in Oshakati to discuss a plan for the unit to attack
SWAPO units at Techipa.[2]:249 The commander persuaded the planners to reconnoitrer the area first before attacking.
On 16 May, two reconnaissance units were airlifted to an area south of Techipa and while the second landed close to
Xangongo but on the western side of the Cunene River.[2]:250 The first team was unable to get close to Techipa while
the second team found tank tracks on all roads showing extensive patrolling of the area. The first team was sent back
in from the north of Techipa by vehicle, finding extensive trench systems around the town reminiscent of the same
layered system around Cuito Cuanavale with vehicles, generators and radar systems and outposts at further distances
south of the town.[2]:250 A decision was then made to establish a new task force but it would only be in operation by
early June, with a specific aim of protecting the water scheme at Calueque.[3]:241 In the mean time three companies
of 32 Battalion would hold the line until the task force was operational and would continue to patrol and reconnoitre
the area south of Techipa.[2]:251
An ambush by 32 Battalion was planned for 22 May. The plan called for a mortar attack on an outpost south of
Techipa which would draw out the Cubans who would be then ambushed.[3]:241 Members of 32 Battalion company
ambushed a Cuban de-mining team before the mortaring began and then found themselves being attacked by four
BRDM-2 armoured personnel carriers and from two other hidden outposts.[2]:251 Fleeing back to the mortar position
under covering mortar fire, the Cubans finally caught up and attacked with the BRDM’s resulting in the abandonment
of three damaged Unimogs.[2]:251 The 32 Battalion company retreated again as BM-21s started shelling. The Cubans
eventually gave up the chase and the company was able to return to the mortar position in search of the missing
vehicles but these had been removed by the Cubans.[2]:251 The remaining missing 32 Battalion members turned up at
Ruacana and Calueque the following day.[2]:251
Following the bungled ambush of the 22 May, the Cubans analysed the intelligence gathered from the captured SADF
vehicles.[3]:242 Cuban intelligence concluded that the South African were planning a major attack on Techipa which
was not the case. June was spent reinforcing the defences around Techipa with consisted of minefields, bunkers and
anti-tank barriers which had been employed successfully to slow down the SADF and UNITA forces around Cuito
Cuanavale during Operation Packer.[3]:242 There was also a build-up of Cuban forces around the town and aggressive
patrolling by SWAPO and FAPLA forces to establish the positions of the South African forces. At the same time
Castro planned an operation consisting of two parts.[3]:242 The first, a two pronged attack, one from Xangongo to
capture Cuamato, then a three column advance from Techipa to capture Calueque joined later by the forces that had
captured Cuamato.[3]:242 The second part of the plan was an air attack on Ruacana if Techipa was attacked by the
SAAF. Castro also notified the Angolan and Soviets of his plan.[3]:242
32.4 10 SA Division formed
By the 27 May, Brigadier Chris Serfontein was appointed 10 SA Division commander while Colonel Roland de
Vries was appointed his Chief of Staff.[1]:725–26 On the 30 May/1 June, operational instructions for Operation Hilti
(to be renamed Operation Prone later) were released to the planners by SADF HQ. The instructions required the
32.5. CLASHES CONTINUE
development of a conventional and counter insurgency plan for north-west South-West Africa and south-western
Angola.[1]:727 The instructions called for a sub-phase called Operation Excite to gain military control of south west
Angola by August 1988.[1]:728 Following Operation Excite, Operation Faction, restoration of SADF influence over
21 days in the area of dispute.[1]:728 And finally Operation Florentine, the installation of UNITA in area of dispute
and to support them against a FAPLA and Cuban attempts to retake the area.[1]:728 This plan would make use of the
10 SA Division, as well as elements of the airforce, the navy operating off the Angolan coast and the insertion of
special forces deep in the FAPLA/Cuban rear.[1]:728–29
To counter the immediate threat of the Cuban advance to the South-West African border, the 10 SA Division planning
team moved to South-West Africa on the 7 June to the operational headquarters at Oshakati and worked on the plan
until 17 June.[1]:736 Part of this plan would become Operation Excite/Hilti. After a visit to SWA/Namibia, General
Jannie Geldenhuys spoke to journalists on 8 June, announcing the Cubans build-up and their advance to the border
region around Ruacana and the call-up of SADF conventional forces made up of citizen reserves.[4]:163 The call-up
was said to be around 140,000 men and was hoped the announcement would send a message to the Cubans to end
their advance to the SWA/Namibian border.[3]:242 Call-up would begin on 21 July and be completed by 25 July with
movement to SWA/Namibia taking place between the 26 and 31 July.[1]:732 Battle training would be completed by
21 August with the units ready to be deployed for action into Southern Angola by the 24 August.[1]:732
32.5 Clashes continue
By 13 June, the new SADF Task Force planned in May, was now in operation under the command of Colonel
Mucho Delport with SADF forces in place east of the Cunene River, south of Xangongo, and around Cuamato and
Calueque.[2]:252 Other SADF forces were positioned west of the Cunene River, with placements around and to the
north-west of Calueque and Ruacana.[2]:252 The task forces headquarters was based at Ruacana. On 18 June, G-2 and
G-5 batteries were in position and ready for use by the Task Force.[2]:252 These were used to shell the Cuban positions.
On 22 June, a company from 32 Battalion clashed with a Cuban unit with tanks and infantry.[2]:253 They were able
to break off contact with the Cubans after assistance from SADF artillery. On the 23 June, reconnaissance units and
members of 32 Battalion spotted three Cuban columns moving southwards from Techipa towards Calueque, with
this stop-start advance continuing until the 26 June.[4]:164 Meanwhile the Cubans and FAPLA forces advanced from
Xangongo on 24 June, the first prong of their plan and attacked the SADF units at Cuamato.[2]:252 201 Battalion[2]:252
with additional elements of Ratels and mortars[3]:243 stopped the advanced and occupation of the town and the Cubans
retreated back to Xangongo. The South African lost a few vehicles and remained in the town.[2]:252 At the same time
the Cubans, Angolan’s and South Africans met in Cairo on 24 June for a second round of tripartite talks.[3]:243 The
two day meeting was led by the Americans with a Soviet delegation in attendance. The meeting was fiery with the
Soviets pulling the Cuban delegation back into line and all that was agreed was that the concept of linkage, a South
African pull-out of Angola followed by the Cubans, was the only option for a future agreement.[3]:243
32.6 Operation Excite
By the 26 June, a 32 Battalion company was moved into position to provide early warning of the Cuban tanks and
columns advancing from Techipa while 61 Mechanised Battalion was brought in behind them to intercept when
required. Using their MRL’s and artillery they hindered and slowed the Cuban advance.[4]:164 Four Ratel ZT3 anti-
tank missile units had also arrived at 61 Mechanised Battalion positions.[2]:252 That evening of the 26 June, SADF
reconnaissance had discovered SA-6 launchers around Techipa. Using a ruse of releasing meteorological balloons
with aluminium strips attached to them, the Cubans fired their SA-6’s narrowing down their location for the SADF
reconnaissance units, and the South African counterattacked with G-5 artillery destroying them and after four hours
other Cuban artillery.[3]:244
On the morning of the 27 June, the Cuban columns began to move again. Elements of 32 Battalion that were
monitoring the column were unable to make contact with 61 Mechanised Battalion to warn them about the advancing
Cubans.[4]:164 61 Mechanised Battalion and their tanks begun moving at the same time to find a better position than
the night lager and when advancing over a low ridge, ran into a forward Cuban units ambush.[4]:165 The leading Ratel
was hit by a RPG and during the battle, four further Ratels were damaged losing one soldier and a further three
wounded. 61 Mechanised called in artillery fire as Cuban reinforcements arrived to support the ambush unit.[3]:245
During the heavy fighting that followed the battalion destroyed a tank, a BTR-60, many trucks and inflicted heavy
casualties on the Cuban infantry forcing them to withdraw.[4]:165 During the battle, 32 Battalion eventually made
contact with 61 Mechanised, informing then that Cuban tanks were on their way. 61 Mechanised released their tanks
and sent them to intercept the Cuban tanks.[4]:153 The SADF tanks made contact and after a half hour had stopped
the advance destroying another T-55 tank, trucks and a BTR-60. The Cubans were forced to withdraw again.[4]:165
Spotting the advance of two Cuban columns Commandant Mike Muller withdrew his forces southwards towards
Calueque attacking one column and then the other with G-5 artillery.[4]:165 Both columns were halted.
Around 1pm, twelve Cuban MiG-23’s based at Lubango and Cahama, flew at tree height to Ruacana, were spotted
by SADF units but were unable to signal an air attack fast enough as the planes turned and headed to attack the
hydroelectric dam at Calueque.[3]:245[4]:165 Two bombed the bridge over the Cunene river and destroyed it, damaged
the sluice gates while another two bombed the power plant and engine rooms. A fifth plane bombed the water irrigation
pipeline to Ovambo, destroying it.[3]:245 One of those bombs from the fifth plane exploded between a Buffel and Eland
90 killing eleven SADF soldiers on ammunition escort duty.[4]:165 Two Cuban planes were hit by 20 mm AA guns
and one crashed on its way back to its base in Angola.[3]:245
The South African soldiers retreated back towards the SWA/Namibian border, crossing in the late afternoon.[3]:244[5]:453
As described above, the air attack part of the Cuban operation went ahead but their ground forces retreated back to
Techipa after the clash.[3]:245
32.7 Undeclared peace
Fearing an revenge attack by the SADF, the Cubans implemented plans that included possible attacks on SWA/Namibia
itself.[3]:246 These plans were scrapped when no retaliation occurred from the South Africans. What followed the
hostilities at Calueque was an undeclared ceasefire.[3]:246 The South African public were shocked by the deaths at
Calueque[4]:165 and the government ordered a scaling back of operations.[3]:245 Battle Group 20 whom with UNITA,
guarding the minefields east of the Cuito River across from Cuito Cuanavale, were ordered to withdraw person-
nel and equipment so as not to take casualties and prevent any further SADF personnel becoming a prisoner of
war.[3]:245[5]:548 UNITA were informed with some regarding this withdrawal as an act of betrayal.[5]:548 Orders were
to ensure no Cubans advance any further than where they were currently positioned.[5]:548 By 10 July, the Cubans
and South African’s were back at the negotiation table in New York for three days.[3]:247 The Cubans surprised the
South African delegation by proposing an honourable Cuban withdrawal from Angola linked to the implementation
of UN Resolution 435 and the ending of support to SWAPO and UNITA.[3]:247 This proposal became known as the
New York Principle though the detail in the proposal would be negotiated at a later date.[3]:248 The parties met again
in the Cape Verde on the 22 July for a fourth round of talks but all that was agreed was the proposal to set up a Joint
Monitoring Commission.[3]:248
32.8 Modified planning
Following the clashes at the end of June, the South African politicians and the military re-evaluated the SADF’s role
in the operational area. What was considered was the change in the military balance brought about by the Cuban
division, the reluctance of the South African public to accept high casualties, the political direction towards the
ending of Apartheid, and the international push to end South Africa’s control of SWA/Namibia.[1]:742 On 19 July
planning was finalised and Operation Hilti was changed to Operation Prone and the new plan became the defence of
SWA/Namibia.[1]:743 It was divided into sub-operations, Operation Linger and Operation Faction (renamed Opera-
tion Pact). Operation Linger became the counterinsurgency plan against SWAPO incursions in SWA and bases in
Angola.[1]:745 Operation Faction (Pact) was the conventional plan that would defend SWA against a Cuban invasion
across the border and the destruction of the remainder of the enemy in Angola with a possible offensive action.[1]:745
Operation Pact was divided into three phases. The first phase was to deceive the Cubans as to the intentions and
disposition of the South African forces, the preparation of the SADF forces, assist in countering any SWAPO raids,
and use of the recces to track the movement and disposition of the Cuban forces.[1]:748 Phase two, would occur
when the Cubans invaded SWA/Namibia, drawing them into areas of SADF control, halting and destroying the
Cubans.[1]:748 The third phase would occur if phase two failed, a delaying retreat by SADF forces to an area around
Tsumeb and the final destruction of the remaining Cuban forces.[1]:749
32.8.1 Airborne assault plan
A plan was drawn up for an attack on the Angolan port of Namibe.[1]:751 This port was the main logistical entrance for
Cuban and FAPLA supplies to the Cuban 50th Division. The plan was developed by Commandant McGill Alexander
of 44 Parachute Brigade, a veteran of Operation Reindeer.[1]:751 The operation would last 72 hours with the objective
being the destruction of the ports logistical capacity; the harbour and railway facilities and the railway line.[6]:394 The
SADF would make use of the navy, airforce, paratroopers and special forces. The planned call for approximately
1200 men, half as an airborne drop and the rest by means of an amphibious assault backed by navy strike craft.[6]:394
The plan was tested during Exercise Magersfontein at Walvis Bay.[6]:394
32.9 Peace talks
Round five of the Tripartite talks began on 2 August 1988 in Geneva, Switzerland. The Soviets joined the meeting
in an observer role. The South Africans opened the negotiations with several proposals: a ceasefire to begin on 10
August 1988, redeployment of South African and Cuban forces in Angola by 1 September 1988, implementation of
UN Resolution 435 and all foreign forces leave Angola by 1 June 1989.[3]:249 The 1 June 1989 proposal angered the
Cuban and Angolans and the talks continued discussing the first three South African proposals. With the assistance
of the Soviets, the American were able to get the Cubans, Angolans and South Africans to sign the Geneva Protocol
on 5 August 1988. The protocol set the following dates:[3]:249
• 10 August 1988 – South Africans to begin withdrawal from Angola
• 1 September 1988 – South Africans complete the withdrawal
• 10 September 1988 – Peace settlement signed
• 1 November 1988 – Implementation of UN Resolution 435
What was not agreed upon was Cuban withdrawal from Angola. This would be negotiated at another meeting in the
near future. Nor were SWAPO or UNITA party to the agreement.
32.10 Ceasefire
On 8 August, the South Africans, Angolans and Cubans announced a ceasefire in Angola and SWA/Namibia.[7] A
line was drawn from Chitado, Ruacana, Calueque, Naulili, Cuamato and Chitado that the Cubans would stay north
of and would guarantee the water irrigation supply from Ruacana to SWA/Namibia.[4]:166 SWAPO, not party to the
agreement, said it would honour the ceasefire on 1 September[7] if South Africa did so, but this did not happen and
SWAPO activities continued.[4]:174 UNITA on the other hand stated that it would ignore the ceasefire and would con-
tinue to fight the Angolan government. It did however state that it wished to stop fighting if the Angolan government
held talks with them or ceased attacking them and seek national reconciliation.[7]
32.11 South African withdrawal from Angola
10 August saw the South African government announce the beginnings of a troop withdrawal from southern Angola,[8]
with the final day for withdrawal of SADF personnel set for 1 September. Battle Group 20, the only SADF force in
south-eastern Angola, had been assisting UNITA to maintain the siege of Cuito Cuanavale after the end of Operation
Packer. This withdrawal by Battle Group 20 southwards was part of Operation Displace. By 16 August the Joint
Monitoring Commission was formed at Ruacana.[8] This Joint Monitoring Commission finalised the terms of the
ceasefire by the 22 August and the formal ceasefire was signed between three parties.[4]:170 Major General Willie
Meyer represented South Africa, General Leopoldo Frias from Cuba and Angola by Colonel Antonio Jose.[1]:759 The
SADF elements arrived at the Angolan/SWA/Namibian border with ten days to spare and had to wait around as the
Joint Monitoring Commission and world media organised themselves for the crossover at Rundu at a temporary steel
bridge that was to take place on 1 September.[5]:549 On 30 August 1988, the last of the South African troops crossed
a temporary steel bridge into SWA/Namibia watched by the world’s media and the Joint Monitoring Commission,
36 hours early than the planned time.[4]:170[8] A convoy of fifty vehicles with around thousand soldiers crossed over
singing battle songs.[8] After officers of the three countries walked across the bridge, the South African sappers begun
to dismantle the temporary steel bridge.[8] The Joint Monitoring Commission then declared on 30 August 1988, that
the South African Defence Force had now left Angola.[3]:250
32.12 Aftermath
On the 1 September 1988, the SADF disbanded the 10 SA Division and the Citizen Force units were returned to
South Africa.[1]:761 Planning however continued for Operation Prone in case further peace negotiation’s failed to
agree to the linkage of the implementation of UN Resolution 435 to the Cuban withdrawal from Angola.[1]:761 Nine
more rounds of negotiations followed revolving around the dates for the Cuban withdrawal from Angola that finally
ended with an agreement called the Tripartite Accord signed on 22 December in New York. This accord finalised
the dates of the Cuban staggered withdrawals from Angola and the implementation of UN Resolution 435 on 1 April
1989.[3]:255
32.13 References
[1] de Vries, Roland (2013). Eye of the Storm. Strength lies in Mobility. Tyger Valley: Naledi. ISBN 9780992191252.
[2] Nortje, Piet (2004). 32 Battalion : the inside story of South Africa’s elite fighting unit. Cape Town: Zebra Press. ISBN
1868729141.
[3] George, Edward (2005). The Cuban intervention in Angola : 1965-1991 : from Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (1. Publ.
Ed.). London [u.a.]: Frank Cass. ISBN 0415350158.
[4] Steenkamp, Willem (1989). South Africa’s border war, 1966-1989. Gibraltar: Ashanti Pub. ISBN 0620139676.
[5] Geldenhuys, saamgestel deur Jannie (2011). Ons was daar : wenners van die oorlog om Suider-Afrika (2de uitg. Ed.).
Pretoria: Kraal Uitgewers. ISBN 9780987025609.
[6] Scholtz, Leopold (2013). The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989. Cape Town: Tafelberg. ISBN 978-0-624-05410-8.
[7] http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/09/world/aug-20-cease-fire-8-year-iran-iraq-war-southern-africa-pact-set-too-angola-truce.
Html
[8] http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/31/world/pretoria-finishes-its-angola-pullout.html
32.14 Further reading
• Geldenhuys, saamgestel deur Jannie (2011). Ons was daar : wenners van die oorlog om Suider-Afrika (2de
uitg. Ed.). Pretoria: Kraal Uitgewers. ISBN 9780987025609.
• George, Edward (2005). The Cuban intervention in Angola : 1965-1991 : from Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale
(1. Publ. Ed.). London [u.a.]: Frank Cass. ISBN 0415350158.
• Hamann, Hilton (2001). Days of the generals (1st ed. Ed.). Cape Town: Zebra. ISBN 978-1868723409.
• Nortje, Piet (2004). 32 Battalion : the inside story of South Africa’s elite fighting unit. Cape Town: Zebra Press.
ISBN 1868729141.
• Scheepers, Marius (2012). Striking inside Angola with 32 Battalion. Johannesburg: 30̊ South. ISBN 978-
1907677779.
• Scholtz, Leopold (2013). The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989. Cape Town: Tafelberg. ISBN 978-0-624-
05410-8.
• de Vries, Roland (2013). Eye of the Storm. Strength Lies in Mobility. Tyger Valley: Naledi. ISBN 9780992191252.
• Steenkamp, Willem (1989). South Africa’s border war, 1966-1989. Gibraltar: Ashanti Pub. ISBN 0620139676.
• Wilsworth, Clive (2010). First in, last out : the South African artillery in action 1975-1988. Johannesburg: 30
South. ISBN 978-1920143404.